Reforming Social Security: A Welfare Analysis by Pecchenino, Rowena A.
1 Social Security Administration
(1997).
2 U.S. Congress (1996) and
Social Security Administration
(1997).
FEDERAL  RESERVE  BANK OF  ST.  LOU IS
19
MARCH/APR I L  1998
Reforming
Social Security:
A Welfare
Analysis
Rowena A. Pecchenino and
Patricia S. Pollard
The U.S. Social Security System was con-ceived as a means to ensure a minimumstandard of living for the elderly, and it
has done so.  Poverty rates among the old
have dropped, and many retirees can now
look forward to a comfortable retirement,
funded in part by their Social Security bene-
fits.  However, the system’s ability to provide
future retirees with a comparable retirement
income has been called into question, and
plans that would fundamentally change the
system have been proposed.
When the Social Security System was
established in 1935, it envisioned the cre-
ation of a large reserve fund to ensure the
continued financing of the system.  Bene-
fits were not scheduled to be paid to those
reaching the age of 65 until 1942 and were
to be based on total lifetime earnings of
contributors.  Before the first dollar was
paid out, the system was amended in
1939.  Benefits were to begin in 1940 and
would be based on average earnings over a
minimum covered period, thereby raising
the benefits received by the average
worker.  In addition, coverage for a
retiree’s dependent children and spouse
were added.  These changes resulted in an
increase in initial payments made by the
system and eliminated the idea of building
up a reserve fund.  Social Security became
grounded as a pay-as-you-go system—con-
tributions made by current workers would
be transferred in the form of benefits to
current retirees.  Current workers then
would rely upon their children’s generation
to finance their retirement benefits.
When Social Security was established, it
covered only workers engaged in commerce
and industry (excluding railroad workers),
about 60 percent of the workforce.  Over
the years, most notably in the 1950s and
1960s, coverage was expanded so that
today 96 percent of all jobs are covered by
Social Security.  There are five categories of
excluded workers: 1) federal civilian employees
hired prior to 1994; 2) railroad workers
(although the railroad retirement program
is coordinated with Social Security); 3) state
and local employees, if they are covered under
a separate retirement program (currently
25 percent of state and local workers are
excluded); 4) household and farm workers
whose earnings are below some minimum
requirement; and 5) self-employed workers
with earnings below $400 a year.1
Over the years, the types of benefits
have expanded, particularly relating to
dependent coverage and survivors.  Disability
coverage was added, and early retirement
programs were instituted.  In addition, the
benefit formulas were changed, resulting
in increases in benefits for all retirees.
Thus, while the average single worker who
retired at age 65 in 1940 received benefit
payments in that year equal to 26 percent
of his pre-retirement wage, the average single
worker who retired at age 65 in 1997
received benefits payments in that year equal
to 45 percent of his pre-retirement wage.2
Not only have the benefits received by
retirees been rising, but the number of
years a retiree is likely to receive benefits
has risen due to increases in life expectancy.
A person retiring in 1940 was expected to
receive benefits for 12 years, if a man, and
13 years, if a woman.  In contrast, a person
retiring in 1997 is expected to receive ben-
efits for 16 years, if a man, and 19 years, if
a woman.  The increasing generosity of the
Social Security system and the increase in
life expectancy have added to the cost of
financing the system.  
Rowena A. Pecchenino is a professor of economics at Michigan State University.  Patricia S. Pollard is a senior economist at the Federal Reserve
Bank of St. Louis.  Heidi L. Beyer provided research assistance.
FEDERAL  RESERVE  BANK OF  ST.  LOU IS
20
3 Of this 12.4 percent, 10.7 is
for the Old-Age and Survivors
portion of Social Security, and
the other 1.7 percent is for the
Disability portion.  The latter
aspect of Social Security did
not exist in 1935. 
4 Beginning in 1983, the United
States undertook a program to
accumulate a large trust fund
by raising taxes well above the
prevailing financing needs of
the system.  The money in this
trust fund is invested in govern-
ment securities.
5 Board of Trustees of the Federal
Old-Age Disability and Survivors
Trust Fund (1996).
6 In 1965, the U.S. Social
Security Act was amended to
require that an advisory council
be established every four years
to analyze the long-term health
of the Social Security program.
Legislation passed after the
establishment of the 1994-96
Advisory Council eliminated this
requirement.
7 An annuity provides a constant
stream of payments throughout
the retirement, regardless of
the life span of an individual.
An annuity is actuarially fair if
its expected value is equal to
the real return on non-annu-
itized saving.
8 Note that the expected value of
the annuity, 
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return on non-annuitized sav-
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While benefits have risen, so too have
the tax rates necessary to fund these benefits.
Social Security tax rates are split equally
between employer and employee.  In 1935,
the combined tax rate was 1 percent of wages.
Today the combined tax rate is 12.4 percent.3
Demographic and economic changes have
raised concerns about the ability of the
system to maintain the current levels of
generosity without further increases in
taxes.  With declining fertility rates, the
potential growth of the labor force is
declining.  Furthermore, declines in the
rate of productivity growth since the 1970s
have reduced the growth in real wages and
thus payments.  
According to the 1996 report of the
Social Security Board of Trustees, payments
made by the Social Security Administration
will exceed contributions beginning in
2013.  The deficit will be financed through
the trust fund.4 By 2029 the trust fund
will be exhausted.  In the following year,
contributions will cover only 75 percent
of payments.5
In 1994, Congress appointed an Advi-
sory Council to study the problems facing
Social Security and to devise a plan to
address these problems.6 The Advisory
Council could not agree on a single plan,
but instead suggested three competing
plans.  This paper develops a model to
analyze these reform proposals.
The next section provides a simple
example to illustrate the problems facing a
pay-as-you-go social security system.  Next,
the paper provides a brief analysis of the
proposals of the Advisory Council.  The
remainder of the paper analyzes the effects
of these reforms on economic growth and
individuals’ welfare.  
A SIMPLE MODEL OF A
PAY-AS-YOU-GO SYSTEM
Before the new plans can be considered,
the current pay-as-you-go system and its
perceived failings must be well understood.
To see how a basic pay-as-you-go social
security system works, we will consider a
very simple economy.  The population of
the economy is divided into two groups—
workers and retirees.  Assume that there
are always (1+n) workers per p retirees;
thus the ratio of retirees to workers, the
aged-dependency ratio, is p/(1+n).  Assume
also that each successive generation of workers
earns real wages ω percent higher than its
predecessor, so that wages are growing at
rate ω.  The government assesses a payroll
tax, τ, on the wages of the workers to fund
the social security benefits of the retirees.  
Consider two successive generations
of retirees.  If the initial wage is w, the first
generation will receive benefits of τw(1+n)/p
per person, and the second generation will
receive τw(1+n)(1+ω)/p per person.  Higher
real wage (productivity) growth, ω, and/or
a higher tax rate, τ, will raise benefits for the
second generation.  In contrast, a higher aged-
dependency ratio, p/(1+n), will lower benefits
for the second generation.  These relation-
ships are true for any pair of generations.  
Is the return on this system good for
the individual saver?  Suppose that, in the
absence of a social security system, an
individual saves during his working years
τw (the amount he would have
contributed to the system), and assume
that actuarially fair annuity contracts are
not available.7 Then the real return to the
worker’s savings is (1+r), and the worker
will have (1+r)τw to fund his retirement.
If
then the worker will have a higher income in
retirement from personal savings than he would
have had under the social security system.
If, however, the inequality given by (1) is
reversed,  then the worker would have been
better off to have saved for retirement through
a social security system. 
Now suppose that actuarially fair annuity
contracts are available and a worker places
all of her savings in an annuity.  The real
return to her savings in this case is (1+r)/p
(when all savers annuitize their saving),8
and the worker will have (1+r)τw/p to
fund her retirement.  If
( ) ( ) (1 1 1 1+ > +
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Security benefits and other pen-
sion benefits.
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the worker will have a higher income in
retirement from personal savings than she
would have had under the social security
system.  If, however, the inequality given
by (2) is reversed, then the worker would
have been better off if a social security
system had been in place.
The results of these simple examples
can be summarized as follows: A pay-as-
you-go social security system benefits the
current generation and all future generations
if the productivity growth rate, ω, is high
enough and the aged-dependency ratio is
low enough.  The availability of actuarially
fair annuity contracts makes the return to
private savings higher and thus makes the
viability of the pay-as-you-go system pro-
portionately more sensitive to changes in
demographics and productivity.
Although the productivity growth
rate has been high enough and the aged-
dependency ratio low enough in the past
to make our present social security system
a success, current trends do not bode well
for its future.  The last decades of the
twentieth century have seen a marked
decline in the birth rate and a significant
increase in longevity in the United States.
Together, these trends have resulted in a
higher percentage of elderly persons in
the population (see Figure 1), an outcome
that can be represented in our simple model
by an increase in p/(1+n).  During this
same period, the rate of productivity growth
has also declined (see Table 1)—a phenom-
enon that can be expressed in our model
by a reduction in ω.  Both trends suggest
that if the current tax rate is kept constant,
benefits will decrease.  If benefits are to
remain constant, the tax rate must be
increased.  Neither choice is without cost.
Reforming Social Security
In response to these demographic and
productivity trends, a recent report by the
government’s 1994-96 Advisory Council
on Social Security has suggested three
plans to modify the U.S. Social Security
System: a maintain benefits (MB) plan, an
individual accounts (IA) plan, and a per-
sonal security accounts (PSA) plan.  All
three plans would increase the number of
workers who contribute to the system by
extending coverage to all new state and
local employees.  At the same time, bene-
fits to current and future retirees would
be reduced slightly under all the plans
through a tax on all Social Security bene-
fits in excess of previously taxed
employee contributions.9
The goal of the MB plan is to minimize
changes to the structure of the current
system while ensuring its financial stability.
Benefits would be reduced slightly in
( ) (2 1 1 1+ > +

 +
r
p
n
p
ω ),
Figure 1
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1  The aged-dependency ratio measures the population aged 65 and over,
  divided by the population aged 20-64.
1
Table 1
Labor Productivity
Average Annual Growth in Business Sector Output per Hour
1950-59
1960-69
1970-79
1980-89
1990-96
1950-72
1973-96
2.88%
3.36
2.03
1.40
0.95
3.07
1.14
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics.
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10 Under all three plans, a portion
of the Social Security tax rev-
enues would continue to be
used to fund the Disability and
Survivors Insurance aspects of
the current Social Security pro-
gram.
11 This model is an extension of
Pecchenino and Pollard
(January 1997) and is fully
derived in Pecchenino and
Pollard (November 1997).
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conjunction with future increases in
payroll tax rates. 
Both the IA plan and the PSA plan would
accelerate scheduled increases in the retirement
age while indexing future retirement-age
increases to increases in longevity.  The key
element of the former plan is a proposed 1.6
percent  increase in the Social Security payroll
taxes on employees.  This portion of the
tax revenues would be placed in government-
managed, individually owned asset portfolios.
Upon the employee’s retirement, these funds
would be converted into annuities that
would be indexed to provide protection
against inflation. 
Under the IA plan, the bulk of the
Social Security program would continue to
be maintained as a pay-as-you-go system,
with revenues from the 12.4 percent Social
Security tax being transferred from workers
to retirees, as at present.  To make the system
financially sound, the growth of basic bene-
fits would be reduced, particularly for those
retirees who were middle and high-wage
workers.  In addition, dependent-spouse
benefits would be reduced.
The PSA plan would move the system
closest to a fully funded program, with 5
percent of the current Social Security pay-
roll tax allocated to personal retirement
accounts held and managed by private
investment firms.  Individuals would have
a wider range of investment opportunities
than under the IA plan, and they would
not be required to convert their funds to
annuities upon retirement.  Workers 55
and older would continue to be covered
under the existing system.  Workers between
the ages of 25 and 54 would receive retire-
ment benefits based on benefits accrued
under the old system as well as contributions
to the new system.  Those under the age of
25 would be covered solely by the new
system.  A temporary payroll tax increase
would be used to finance this transition
period.  The remaining 7.4 percent payroll
tax would be used to provide a minimum
level of income for all retirees.10
According to analyses conducted by
the Social Security Office of the Chief
Actuary, all three plans would keep the
system in actuarial balance for the next 75
years.  However, these analyses did not take into
account the effects that endogenous changes in
individuals’ savings decisions could have on
capital accumulation, interest rates, and wages. 
To examine these endogenous responses
and analyze simplified versions of the Advi-
sory Council’s plans, we first developed a
model of an economy with an extant pay-
as-you-go social security system.  In this
economy, individuals work when young
and allocate their income to current
consumption, saving for future consumption,
and payment of social security taxes.  When
old, individuals retire and consume their
accumulated savings and social security
benefits.  Their consumption/saving decisions
determine the level and growth rate of the
capital stock and thus the interest rate, the
wage rate, and the productivity growth rate.
Since they cannot predict with any accuracy
when they will die, they may have leftover
savings to bequeath to their children.  Without
modification, this model allows us to examine
the MB plan.  We extend it to examine the
IA and PSA plans by allowing for govern-
ment investment on individuals’ accounts
and for individual investment in retirement
accounts mandated by the government but
controlled by the workers.  In our model,
as in the IA plan, all government investment
will be converted to annuities upon the
retirement of the account holders.  Further,
annuities also will be available to individual
employees under the PSA version of the
model; however, the employee will not be
required to invest in them, and their avail-
ability may be rationed.   
THE MODEL
In this section we briefly discuss the
assumptions underlying the model.11 We
consider an infinite-horizon economy
comprised of identical individuals,
perfectly competitive firms, annuity
markets, and a government.
Characteristics of Individuals
A new generation is born at each date, t.
For simplicity we assume that there is no
population growth.  This assumption
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enables us to concentrate attention on the
aged-dependency ratio rather than on fer-
tility trends.  Individuals in this model, as
in Eckstein, et al. (1985), are not altruistic.
Individual preferences are defined on the
basis of consumption alone.  In the first
period of life, each young individual is
endowed with one unit of labor, which he
or she supplies inelastically to firms.
Wages and bequests, if any, are allocated
among the worker’s current consumption,
savings for consumption in retirement (in
the form of an annuity, direct holdings of
capital, or both), and payment of social
security taxes, τ, quoted as a proportion of
the worker’s wages.  In the final period of
their lives, individuals retire and supply
their savings inelastically to firms and con-
sume their after-tax social security benefits
and their accumulated savings.  Individual
life spans are uncertain.  The probability
that an individual will die at the onset of
retirement is [1-p(t)] and the probability
that he will live throughout the retirement
period is p(t).  If an individual dies at the
onset of retirement, his unannuitized
wealth is bequeathed to his children.    
In this model, a person wishes to allo-
cate his wage and bequest incomes over
the course of his lifetime to maximize his
consumption.  Many factors affect this
allocation decision.  
First, the longer he expects to live, the
greater the necessity of saving.  But he
cannot predict how long he will live.
Second, how much he needs to save
will depend on the return to his private
savings.  But higher returns to private
savings induce two contrary effects.  They
mean that future consumption is cheap
relative to current consumption, so defer-
ring consumption makes sense.  However,
they also mean he can save less without
reducing future consumption.  So the
worker must choose between deferred
gratification and increased current
consumption.  In addition, the return to
private savings can be affected by the
availability of actuarially fair annuity con-
tracts.  All else equal, the return on a
portfolio increases with the percentage
held as an annuity.  
Finally, anticipated social security ben-
efits can affect the decision to save.  The
more one expects to receive, the less need
there is for one to save.  However, benefits
must be paid for, and higher benefits
require higher taxes.  As a result, there will
be less after-tax income to spend or save.  
The individual worker must balance
all these forces to decide upon a lifetime
consumption path.  
The Role of Firms
The firms in our model are perfectly
competitive profit maximizers that produce
output using a Cobb-Douglas production
function Y(t) = A(t)K(t)βN(t)1-β, βe[0,1].
K(t) is the capital stock at t, N(t) is employ-
ment at t, and A(t) > 0 is a productivity
scalar.  Capital depreciates fully in the
production process.12 The production func-
tion can be written in intensive form as
y(t) = A(t)k(t)β, where k(t) is the capital-
labor ratio.  Assume, because of external
effects of aggregate capital on productivity,
as suggested by Romer (1986), A(t) =
a(t)K(t)η, a(t) > 0, η ≥ 0, so that the
aggregate capital stock, K(t), enters the tech-
nology as a constant from the perspective
of current producers.    This formulation
allows a straightforward analysis of the
effects of personal actions—and those of
the government—on economic growth.  It
is not necessary for our major conclusions. 
Government’s Role
The government in our model
economy can impose social security taxes,
τ(t), on the wages of the young at time t.
It may also impose a tax on the social
security benefits of the retired if retirees’
income exceeds some means test.  Finally,
it may adjust a retiree’s social security ben-
efit to guarantee that his/her total income
(saving and social security benefits) is at
least some fraction, ζ, of per capita gross
domestic product, y(t).  With a means test,
if a retiree’s total income is more than
some multiple (1+ξ) of the guaranteed
income, ζy(t),  then her social security
benefits are taxed at the rate σ.  The
12 Given that we will treat each
time period, t, as 25 years, this
is not an extreme assumption.
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government must fully fund all expendi-
tures with tax receipts; it must have a
balanced budget. 
Annuity Market
We assume initially, following
Sheshinski and Weiss (1981), that actu-
arially fair annuity contracts are unavailable
on the private market.  The government
overcomes this market failure by establishing
a market in actuarially fair annuity con-
tracts, and once the market is established,
it has an interest in controlling access to
this market (see the following section).
There are several ways that the government
could control access.  First, it could
place restrictions on annuity purchases,
similar to the restrictions it currently
places on tax-deferred investments.  In
this case,  individuals could annuitize
some percentage of their total savings
upon retirement.  Second, the government
could mandate that each individual
place a fixed amount in an annuity.
Third, it could license private firms to
provide actuarially fair annuities as part
of a mutual fund but restrict the propor-
tion of the fund that could be annuitized.
The first and third methods of accessing
the annuity market are identical in the
context of our model.  The second
method is what is imagined for the
implementation of the IA plan.
THE CASE AGAINST FULL
ANNUITIZATION
The current pay-as-you-go social
security system provides retirees with an
annuity, disbursing benefits throughout
their retirement regardless of how long
they live.  However, the link between
one’s contributions and one’s benefits is
broken by the pay-as-you-go structure of
the program.  In contrast, private pension
plans often allow or require annuitization
of pension benefits.  These plans are
increasingly defined-contribution plans
that, although they pay out for as long as
a retiree lives, directly link pension bene-
fits to the amount contributed and market
returns on the asset portfolio in which the
contributions were invested.  Thus, annuity
contracts are already a large part of retirees’
investment portfolios.  We are interested
in determining the effects of annuitizing
saving in order to determine whether
annuitization should be a part of a modi-
fied social security structure, as has been
suggested by the IA plan.
Sheshinski and Weiss (1981) find in
a simple model in which the interest rate
is exogenously fixed that the socially
optimal, fully funded social security scheme
for individuals who have no bequest motive
(as in our model), is one in which indi-
vidual workers place all their savings in
annuities.13 In the Sheshinski-Weiss
model, individual optimality and social
optimality coincide.  In our model, sav-
ings decisions affect the capital stock
and thereby the interest rate.  Individual
workers still want to invest in assets that
offer the highest return possible, and in
our case this is an annuity. (This model
suggests that, while the PSA plan does
not mandate annuitization of saving,
actuarially fair contracts will be
purchased if they are available.)  But if
individuals can fully annuitize their
saving, they will not leave any uninten-
tional bequests.  Workers will see their
disposable income reduced, and they will
save less.  Further, because they can hold
an annuity, they will face less risk in not
being able to predict when they will die.
This also lowers saving.  Since the rate of
saving is closely linked to the rate of
growth, the government will want to
encourage saving and thus discourage
(although not necessarily prohibit) the
purchase of annuity contracts.
COMPARATIVE DYNAMICS
The partial equilibrium analyses of
the social security plans suggested by the
Advisory Council are silent on the
effects of these new plans on individual
savings choices, and thus on capital
accumulation and growth.  Our model is
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simple enough to allow us to examine
these effects.  In this section we assume
that the conditions for growth are met (see
Pecchenino and Pollard, November 1997),
and we summarize how economic growth—
and thus the actuarial balance of the
plans—is affected by the following:
changes in the social security tax rate,
demographic changes that extend the
period of retirement, changes in the
percentage of savings held as an annuity,
and the presence of a means test or income
guarantee.  These results will provide us
with intuition that we will use to assess
whether the Advisory Council’s plans will
be in actuarial balance once the general
equilibrium effects have been taken into
account.  They will also help us to design
an alternative plan under which actuarial
balance is maintained in the face of the
general equilibrium effects.
We find that, all else equal, pay-as-
you-go social security taxes create strong
disincentives to saving.  Accordingly,
increases in the tax rate, τ, reduce growth.
This phenomenon results because an
increase in the social security tax rate
imposes a negative income effect on
workers and a positive income effect on
retirees via higher social security benefits.
Both effects reduce saving, which reduces
capital accumulation and hence the
growth rate of per capita income.  This
line of reasoning suggests that, all else
equal, increasing the social security tax
rate will undermine actuarial balance.
Thus the planned increases in social secu-
rity taxes that are designed to keep the
Maintained Benefits plan in balance may
have an effect opposite to that intended.
Demographic considerations also
affect saving behavior, and these effects
interact with the features of the social
security system and the methods of saving
available.  For example, if all wealth is
annuitized, then the rate of economic
growth increases with the expected length
of life.  This happens because greater
longevity tends to heighten people’s incen-
tive to save, thereby increasing society’s
capital accumulation.  If wealth is only
partially annuitized, increased life span
also reduces bequests, since people who
live longer consume a greater proportion
of their wealth.  At the same time, the mar-
ginal return to an annuity, (1+r)/p, and
social security benefits are decreased, since
the tax revenues must be shared among a
larger population of retirees.  The first two
effects reduce the incentive to save, while
the last one increases it; the net effect is
ambiguous.  Thus it may be that leaving
well enough alone is a feasible option (in
the sense of actuarial balance) and the tax
increases and benefit reductions mooted
for the MB plan may not be necessary.
Further, in light of increasing longevity, it
may not be necessary to increase the age of
eligibility for Social Security, as suggested
under the PS and IA plans, since
individuals will plan for their longer
period of retirement by saving more.
While economic analysis suggests that
savers would choose to fully annuitize
their saving upon retirement, in actuality
the percentage of savings now held in
annuity contracts in the United States is
relatively small, in large part because of
market failures.14 If access to annuity mar-
kets were improved by the introduction of
actuarially fair contracts, and if a greater
percentage of wealth were annuitized, then
bequests would fall, effectively reducing
workers’ income.  The workers would then
respond by reducing both their rate of saving
and their consumption today.  However, an
increase in the percentage of annuitized
wealth increases the return to saving, which
has a positive income effect on the workers.
In the absence of a pay-as-you-go social
security scheme in which savings can be
annuitized, only the negative bequest
effect is realized, leading to reduced saving
and reduced growth.  With a pay-as-you-
go scheme, the two effects interact.  If the
bequest effect is weaker than the annuitiza-
tion effect, saving and growth will rise.  If it
is not, higher rates of annuitization may
lead to decreased saving and lower rates of
growth; actuarially fair annuities may
decrease dynamic social welfare.  Thus, the
PSA and IA plans may not have their
intended effects and could worsen rather
than improve actuarial balance.    
14 This calculation of annuitized
saving does not include Social
Security.
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Under the IA plan, it is possible that
individuals will not choose to save beyond
the government-mandated level.  If this is
the case, then increasing mandated saving
is equivalent to increasing the percentage
of savings held as annuities but with no
negative side effects on bequests.  Thus
saving, and therefore capital accumulation
and growth, will increase,15 and actuarial
balance will be maintained or improved.
Because individuals are identical in
our model, a means test will either reduce
the benefits of all retirees or affect no one’s
benefits.  Similarly, an income guarantee
will either raise the benefits of all retirees
or affect the benefits of no retiree.  With a
means test, if the income of each retiree
exceeds the cutoff income level, (1+ξ)ζy(t),
then the retiree’s social security benefits
are taxed.  This action effectively reduces
retirees’ incomes and increases workers’
incentives to save.  Thus capital accumula-
tion and growth rise.  An income guarantee
has the opposite effect.  Since no matter
what consumption and saving choices
individuals make when they are young,
they will not be left destitute in retirement,
they have less incentive to save.  Further,
the more generous the income guarantee,
the higher will be the taxes imposed on
workers to fund it.  This step also reduces
saving and thereby capital accumulation
and growth.  Thus, while means testing
may improve actuarial balance, the imposi-
tion of a minimum income guarantee, all
else equal, will not.  
DYNAMIC SOCIAL WELFARE
Policies aimed at fundamentally
changing the Social Security System must
garner the necessary political support.  To
do so, they must benefit current constituents.
Thus, any growth-inducing policy that
enhances the actuarial balance of the
Social Security program must do so
without hurting either current beneficia-
ries or current workers.  In this section we
analyze policies that improve the well-being
of current workers and beneficiaries as well
as that of all future generations.  These poli-
cies, while similar to the plans suggested by
the Advisory Council on Social Security,
avoid the general equilibrium pitfalls identi-
fied above.
We analyze the various policies by sim-
ulating three variations of our model.  In
each variant we assume that actuarially fair
annuity contracts are available, although
the percentage of an individual’s wealth that
can be annuitized may be restricted.  In the
first variation, the means test is binding, so
the social security benefits of all retirees are
taxed.  In the second variation, the income
guarantee is binding, so all social security
recipients have incomes below the income
guarantee threshold.  In the third variation,
neither the means test nor the income guar-
antee is binding, so all social security recipients
have incomes above the minimum guarantee
but below the tax-free ceiling.   Another
variation of the model, in which the govern-
ment mandates saving, such as the IA plan,
is not simulated.  If the level of mandated
saving is less than what individuals would
voluntarily choose to save, then any increase
in forced saving decreases growth and so
cannot improve actuarial balance.  On the
other hand, if the level of mandated saving
exceeds what individuals would voluntarily
choose to save, then they are worse off as a
result of the program, so while it may improve
actuarial balance, it will lack political support.
To begin our analysis, we first create a
set of baselines by calibrating the economy
to achieve a 2 percent growth rate per year.
The parameters for the economy used in
the baseline simulation, given in Table 2,
are based on empirical estimates for the
U.S. economy.  The social security tax rate,
τ, is derived from OECD data on Social
Security contributions as a percentage of
GDP, and adjusted for labor’s share in
output (1-β).16 The degree of annuitization,
γ, reflects the value of private pension funds
as a percentage of U.S. household net
wealth.17 The aged-dependency ratio, p,
was set to equal the current ratio of the pop-
ulation aged 65 and over to the population
between the ages of 20 and 64.   The value
for β reflects capital’s share of output.
Balanced growth in the model requires
β+η=1.18 Using this restriction gives the
value for η used in the simulations.
MARCH/APR I L 1998
15 This could occur because indi-
viduals are myopic and do not
save for retirement.
16 The Social Security data include
employee and employer contri-
butions to Medicare, and the
Old-Age, Disability and Death
portion of Social Security.
Mandatory pension contribu-
tions covering federal employ-
ees are also included.  For
more details see OECD
(1993).
17 See Auerbach, Kotlikoff, and
Weil (1992).  The results pre-
sented in this section are invari-
ant to small changes in the
value of γ.
18 Balanced growth implies that
capital, output, consumption,
and transfers are all growing at
the same constant rate of 2
percent per year.  The results of
the simulations, however, are
not dependent upon this
assumption. 
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These parameters are the same for all
three variations of the model simulated.
For the variation in which the means test
is binding, the tax rate for social security
benefits, σ,  is 0.30, the tax rate for high-
income individuals.  The income guarantee
parameter, ζ, and the means test parameter, ξ,
are determined endogenously in the model.   
After calculating the baselines, we
changed the age mix of the population and
re-simulated the economy, keeping a(t) at
its baseline path.  Specifically, we assumed
that each generation through those born at
t = 4 had a 20 percent probability of living
throughout the retirement period.  Given
the absence of population growth in the
model, the aged-dependency ratio equals
this probability.  For the generations born
in periods 5, 6, and 7,  the probability of
living through the retirement period
increased to 0.238, 0.37, and 0.406, respec-
tively.19 These probabilities correspond to
the projected aged-dependency ratios for the
United States in 2015, 2040, and 2065.20
RESULT 1: In all variations of
the model, relative to the set of
baseline simulations and when the
social security tax rate is fixed, an
aging population generates growth
and lifetime utility paths that domi-
nate the baseline paths.
As stated earlier, if wealth is only par-
tially annuitized, γ < 1, the net effect of
increased life span on growth is ambiguous.
Result 1 indicates that, given the parameters
in Table 2 and the path of aging specified
above, the negative effects on saving of
reduced bequests and a lower marginal
return on saving are dominated by the pos-
itive effect on saving of a decline in expected
social security benefits.  Lifetime utility rises
for two reasons.  First, the higher growth
rate of the economy causes consumption
to increase and utility, in turn, to rise.
Second, most individuals prefer a long life
to a shorter one, so their utility rises with
their life span.  Thus, a modified MB plan
is both feasible and utility-enhancing.  For
this result, individuals must know that
their social security benefits will adjust to
keep the burden of the program constant.
After incorporating the effects of an
aging population into the model, we exam-
ined the possibility of phasing out the
pay-as-you-go system and replacing it with
a fully-funded system that is very much
like the PSA plan.  That is, we examined
whether we can do better than the modified
MB plan of Result 1, above.  Comparing
the results of these simulations with the
pure aging effects, the aging baseline (the
modified MB plan),  allowed us to make
comparisons with respect to growth and
dynamic social welfare.
RESULT 2: In all variations of
the model, raising the annuitization
rate, γ, above some threshold rate
in period t, and eliminating the
social security tax rate, τ, in period
t+1 results in a lifetime utility path
that Pareto dominates the aging
economy path (i.e., both workers
and retirees would be at least as
well off as they are under the
present system).
From the perspective of the generation
of workers who are currently paying social
security taxes, a policy to reduce τ when
they reach retirement will reduce their life-
time utility (even if the policy is announced
in advance).  This utility reduction can be
offset by allowing this generation to increase
the annuitization of its wealth, thereby
raising the marginal return on its saving.
Thus, any Pareto-optimal policy that
19The time period in which the
age structure of the population
changes does not affect the
results of the model.
20These projections are based on
estimates by the Board of
Trustees of the Federal Old-Age,
Disability and Survivors Trust
Fund (1996).
Table 2
Baseline Parameter Values
for the Simulations
τ
γ
β
η
ρ
σ
0.127
0.165
0.30
0.70
0.20
0.30
Parameter Value
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eliminates the pay-as-you-go plan must
raise the annuitization rate before it reduces
the social security tax rate, and this can be
done only by means of actuarially fair con-
tracts.  If the maximum annuitization rate
is set too low, current workers will be worse
off with the phase-out plan.   Beyond this,
the level to which γ is raised depends on
the weight given by  policymakers to the
preferences of current workers versus
future generations.  Current workers would
prefer a high annuitization rate, while future
generations would benefit from lower annu-
itization rates.  Figure 2 illustrates these results
for the case in which neither the means test
nor the income guarantee is binding.  The
annuitization rate, γ,  is increased in period
5, and the tax rate, τ,  is lowered in period
6.  The choice of these periods does not
affect the results.  The results for the case in
which the means test is binding and the one
in which the minimum guarantee is binding
are similar to those shown in Figure 2.  In
the case of a binding minimum guarantee,
utility is higher without the income guarantee
than with it, so completely phasing out the
pay-as-you-go system is both feasible and
welfare-enhancing.
RESULT 3: In all variations of
the model, raising the annuitization
rate, γ, above some threshold rate
in period t, and reducing the social
security tax rate, τ, in periods t+1,
t+2, and t+3 also results in a lifetime
utility path that Pareto dominates
the aging path.
As Figure 3 shows, extending the
phase-out period of the pay-as-you-go
system does not change the basic result
that moving to a fully-funded system can
be Pareto optimal, nor does it change the
preferences of current generations versus
future generations with regard to the
annuitization rate. However, gradually
reducing the social security tax rate
reduces the minimum γ needed to ensure
that the phase-out plan is Pareto optimal.
Figure 4 compares the results of the
two-step phase-out plan described in
Result 2 with the four-step phase-out plan
described in Result 3.   The top panel indi-
cates, as noted above, that with a gradual
reduction in the social security tax rate,
the annuitization rate does not have to be
raised as high to make the current genera-
tion of workers better off.   All three panels
indicate the intergenerational effects of a
short phase-out period versus a long one.
Workers who are currently paying social
security taxes would prefer a longer phase-
out period, since this reduces their portion
of the burden.  Because the present social
security system has a negative effect on
Figure 2
Lifetime Utility Under a Two-Step
Phase-Out of Social Security
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saving, the more rapid the phase-out, the
more rapid the rise in saving and thus eco-
nomic growth.  Because this higher growth
rate would raise the lifetime utility of
future generations through its effect on
consumption, future generations would
benefit from a short phase-out period.
Independent of the phase-out period,
and for a plan very like the PSA plan, actu-
arial balance can be maintained without
imposing extraordinary taxes.  Our results
differ from those of the Office of the Chief
Actuary because ours encompass the general
equilibrium effects of aging, annuitization,
and tax relief on saving.
CONCLUSION  
This analysis establishes that, in the
model economy, a pay-as-you-go social
security scheme can be replaced by an
actuarially fair pension system very like
the PSA plan suggested by the Advisory
Council on Social Security.  This result
holds even in the presence of a minimum
income guarantee means tests for benefits.
Two factors drive this result.  First, in our
model, opening up actuarially fair annuity
markets raises the return on savings,
thereby encouraging higher saving rates.
Second, the pay-as-you-go system reduces
saving in the economy because benefits are
not tied directly to contributions.
Eliminating such a system would raise the
saving rate.  These two positive effects on
saving would increase the growth rate of
the economy, providing benefits for all
individuals.  While our results indicate
that the move to a fully funded system
would have clear benefits for future gener-
ations, it cautions that the benefits for
current workers are smaller and less easy
to obtain. 
REFERENCES
Auerbach, Alan J., Laurence J. Kotlikoff, and David N. Weil.  “The
Increasing Annuitization of the Elderly–Estimates and Implications for
Intergenerational Transfers, Inequality, and National Saving,” NBER
Working Paper No. 4182, 1992.
Board of Trustees of the Federal Old-Age, Disability and Survivors Trust
Fund. Annual Report, 1996.
Figure 4
4 5 6 7 8
γ=0.265
γ=0.565
γ=0.865
–1.0
0.0
1.0
2.0
– 1.0
0.0
1.0
2.0
Generations
Generations
Lifetime Utility Under Alternative
Phase-Out Plans
Deviation from Aging Baseline
Two-step plan Four-step plan
4 5 6 7 8
Generations
Two-step plan Four-step plan
4 5 6 7 8
–1.0
0.0
1.0
2.0
Two-step plan Four-step plan
Eckstein, Zvi, Martin Eichenbaum, and Dan Peled.  “Uncertain Lifetimes
and the Welfare Enhancing Properties of Annuity Markets and Social
Security,” Journal of Public Economics (April 1985) pp. 303-26.
OECD. Revenue Statistic of OECD Member Countries: 1965-1992.  Paris:
OECD, 1993.
Pecchenino, Rowena, and Patricia Pollard.  “The Effects of Annuities,
Bequests, and Aging in an Overlapping Generations Model of
Endogenous Growth,” Economic Journal (January 1997), pp. 26-46.
______ and ______.  “The Transition from a Pay-As-You-Go to a
Fully-funded Social Security System: Is There a Role for Social
Insurance,” Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Working Paper No. 97-
022A, November 1997.
Romer, Paul. “Increasing Returns and Long-Run Growth,” Journal of
Political Economy (October 1986), pp. 1002-37.
Sheshinski, E., and Y. Weiss. “Uncertainty and Optimal Social Security
Systems,” Quarterly Journal of Economics (May 1981), pp. 189-
206.
Social Security Administration. Social Security Programs in the United
States, Social Security Administration, 1997.
Social Security Advisory Council. Report of the 1994-1996 Advisory
Council on Social Security, Vols. I and II, Social Security
Administration, 1997.
U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Ways and
Means. Greenbook: Background Material and Data on Major
Programs Within the Jurisdiction of the Committee on Ways and
Means, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1996.
MARCH/APR I L 1998
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST.  LOU IS
30
